动态机制设计：基础导论
Dynamic mechanism design: An elementary introduction
AI总结：
本文以导论形式介绍动态机制设计，分别刻画最优机制的完美贝叶斯激励相容条件与有效机制中的 Groves 唯一性，并说明静态机制设计结果可扩展至动态环境。
摘要：
本文以基础方式介绍动态机制设计。我们首先考察最优动态机制：找出完美贝叶斯激励相容的充要条件，并阐述最优动态机制问题。随后考察有效动态机制：确立 Groves 机制的唯一性，并针对双边交易环境较为详细地研究动态 pivot 机制的预算平衡。本导论表明，静态机制设计的许多结果和技术可直接扩展并调整，用于分析动态环境。
英文摘要：
This paper introduces dynamic mechanism design in an elementary fashion. We first examine optimal dynamic mechanisms: We find necessary and sufficient conditions for perfect Bayesian incentive compatibility and formulate the optimal dynamic mechanism problem. We next examine efficient dynamic mechanisms: We establish the uniqueness of Groves mechanism and investigate budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism in some detail for a bilateral trading environment. This introduction reveals that many results and techniques of static mechanism design can be straightforwardly extended and adapted to the analysis of dynamic settings.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
