共享受约束的网络中的公共物品
Public goods in networks with constraints on sharing
AI总结:
本文构建网络中可部分共享物品的供给模型,证明专业化纯策略 Nash 均衡存在,并发现放松共享约束反而可能降低效率。
摘要:
本文研究了沿社会联系可部分共享的物品的供给激励。我们引入一个模型,其中社会网络中的每个个体不仅决定提供多少可共享物品,还决定提名哪些邻居子集作为共同受益人。该模型的一个结果规定了原始网络中内生生成的子网络,以及在实现的子网络上发生的公共物品博弈。我们证明了专业化纯策略 Nash 均衡的存在性:在这些均衡中,一些个体作出贡献,而其余个体搭便车。随后,我们考察随着共享约束放松,有效专业化均衡的集合如何变化,并表明矛盾的是,可共享性的提高可能会降低效率。
英文摘要:
This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are partially shareable along social links. We introduce a model in which each individual in a social network not only decides how much of a shareable good to provide, but also decides which subset of neighbours to nominate as co-beneficiaries. An outcome of the model specifies an endogenously generated subnetwork of the original network and a public goods game occurring over the realised subnetwork. We prove the existence of specialised pure strategy Nash equilibria: those in which some individuals contribute while the remaining individuals free ride. We then consider how the set of efficient specialised equilibria vary as the constraints on sharing are relaxed and we show that, paradoxically, an increase in shareability may decrease efficiency.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。