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arXiv 2407.11273econ.TH
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择校问题中的信息规模

Informational Size in School Choice

Di Feng, Yun Liu

AI总结:

本文提出择校问题中的信息规模度量,发现IA机制比DA、TTC和SD机制信息需求更少,且学生较多时TTC比DA更省信息,为机制比较提供新视角。

摘要:

本文提出了一种新的信息规模度量方法,用于择校问题,其思想源自Mount和Reiter(1974)。该概念通过计算在所有可能的匹配问题中,为确保某个学生与学校的特定配对分配所需的最大相关偏好和优先级排名,来衡量匹配机制的信息规模。我们的分析揭示了两个关键见解。首先,三种著名的策略证明匹配机制——延迟接受(DA)机制、顶层交易环(TTC)机制和串行独裁(SD)机制——在信息需求上(严格)少于非策略证明的即时接受(IA)机制。这一结果凸显了IA在信息需求方面此前被忽视的优势,这在一定程度上解释了其在现实世界匹配问题中的普及,尤其是在获取信息既需要金钱成本又需要认知成本的情况下。其次,当匹配问题至少包含四名学生时,与DA相比,TTC实现期望分配所需的信息更少。TTC与DA之间的比较问题一直困扰着理论研究者(Gonczarowski和Thomas,2023)和实验研究者(Hakimov和Kubler,2021)。我们的结果从信息角度回应了这一问题:在相对较少学生的实验中,代理人倾向于选择DA而非TTC,因为DA在所有问题中确保个人分配所需的信息更少(Guillen和Veszteg,2021),而当市场规模增大时,情况则相反(Pais等,2011)。此外,我们的信息规模概念为理解一些常用匹配机制在可审计性(Grigoryan和Moller,2024)、操纵脆弱性(Pathak和Sonmez,2013)和隐私保护(Haupt和Hitzig,2022)方面的差异提供了新视角。

英文摘要:

This paper introduces a novel measurement of informational size to school choice problems, which inherits its ideas from Mount and Reiter (1974). This concept measures a matching mechanism's information size by counting the maximal relevant preference and priority rankings to secure a certain pairwise assignment of a student to a school across all possible matching problems. Our analysis uncovers two key insights. First, the three prominent strategy-proof matching mechanisms, the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism, the top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism, and the serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism, is (strictly) less informative than the non-strategy-proof immediate acceptance (IA) mechanism. This result highlights a previously omitted advantage of IA in term of its information demand, which partially explain the its popularity in real-world matching problems especially when acquiring information is both pecuniarily and cognitively costly. Second, when the matching problem contains at least four students, the TTC demands less information compared to the DA to implement a desired allocation. The issue of comparison between TTC and DA has puzzled researchers both in theory (Gonczarowski and Thomas, 2023) and in experiment (Hakimov and Kubler, 2021). Our result responds to this issue from an informational perspective: in experiments with relatively fewer students, agents tend to prefer DA over TTC as DA requires fewer information to secure one's allocation in all problems (Guillen and Veszteg, 2021), while the opposite is true when the market size increases (Pais et al., 2011). Among others, our informational size concept offers a new perspective to understand the differences in auditability (Grigoryan and Moller, 2024), manipulation vulnerability (Pathak and Sonmez, 2013), and privacy protection (Haupt and Hitzig, 2022), among some commonly used matching mechanisms.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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