This paper introduces a novel measurement of informational size to school choice problems, which inherits its ideas from Mount and Reiter (1974). This concept measures a matching mechanism's information size by counting the maximal relevant preference and priority rankings to secure a certain pairwise assignment of a student to a school across all possible matching problems. Our analysis uncovers two key insights. First, the three prominent strategy-proof matching mechanisms, the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism, the top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism, and the serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism, is (strictly) less informative than the non-strategy-proof immediate acceptance (IA) mechanism. This result highlights a previously omitted advantage of IA in term of its information demand, which partially explain the its popularity in real-world matching problems especially when acquiring information is both pecuniarily and cognitively costly. Second, when the matching problem contains at least four students, the TTC demands less information compared to the DA to implement a desired allocation. The issue of comparison between TTC and DA has puzzled researchers both in theory (Gonczarowski and Thomas, 2023) and in experiment (Hakimov and Kubler, 2021). Our result responds to this issue from an informational perspective: in experiments with relatively fewer students, agents tend to prefer DA over TTC as DA requires fewer information to secure one's allocation in all problems (Guillen and Veszteg, 2021), while the opposite is true when the market size increases (Pais et al., 2011). Among others, our informational size concept offers a new perspective to understand the differences in auditability (Grigoryan and Moller, 2024), manipulation vulnerability (Pathak and Sonmez, 2013), and privacy protection (Haupt and Hitzig, 2022), among some commonly used matching mechanisms.
Smart Lotteries in School Choice: Ex-ante Pareto-Improvement with Ex-post Stability
UNSW Sydney(新南威尔士大学);ELTE Centre for Economic and Regional Studies(布达佩斯经济区域研究中心);Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University(马斯特里赫特大学数量经济学系);HUN-REN Institute for Computer Science and Control(匈牙利科学院计算机与控制研究所);Budapest University of Technology and Economics(布达佩斯技术与经济大学)
University of Essex(埃塞克斯大学);Pforzheim University(波茨海姆大学);ZEW(欧洲 Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (莱布尼茨经济研究所));Queen’s University Belfast(贝尔法斯特女王大学)
London School of Economics and Political Science(伦敦政治经济学院);Universidad de Montevideo(蒙得维的亚大学);Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Chile(智利大学经济与商学院经济学系)
Information, entropy and the paradox of choice: A model for understanding human choice behavior
School of Biological Sciences, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM)(基础科学研究所生物科学学院);Department of Physics, Middle East Technical University(中东理工大学物理系);Pegah Dadekavan Sharif Company (TAPSELL)(佩加·达德卡万沙里夫公司(塔普塞尔));Department of Medical Genetics, National Institute of Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (NIGEB)(国家基因工程与生物技术研究所医学遗传学系)