顶级交易周期的新公理
New axioms for top trading cycles
摘要：
择校在理论和实践上都具有重要意义。用公理化方法研究了（学生最优）顶部交易周期机制。我们引入了两个新的公理：MBG（相互最佳组）-配额合理性和MBG-鲁棒有效性。而稳定性意味着MBG-配额理性，MBG-鲁棒有效性弱于鲁棒有效性，而鲁棒有效性强于有效性和群体策略防御性的组合。TTCM具有MBG-配额合理性和MBG-鲁棒有效性的特征。我们的研究结果为将TTCM与其他择校机制进行比较提供了新的基础，特别是Ergin而不是Kesten非循环优先结构下的学生最优稳定机制。
英文摘要：
School choice is of great importance both in theory and practice. This paper studies the (student-optimal) top trading cycles mechanism (TTCM) in an axiomatic way. We introduce two new axioms: MBG (mutual best group)-quota-rationality and MBG-robust efficiency. While stability implies MBG-quota-rationality, MBG-robust efficiency is weaker than robust efficiency, which is stronger than the combination of efficiency and group strategy-proofness. The TTCM is characterized by MBG-quota-rationality and MBG-robust efficiency. Our results construct a new basis to compare the TTCM with the other school choice mechanisms, especially the student-optimal stable mechanism under Ergin but not Kesten-acyclic priority structures.
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