成对理性与单峰、单谷域上的顶级交易循环

中文摘要 AI 辅助

在最近的一项研究中，Ekici和Yenmez（2026）通过策略防止性、个体理性与成对理性，在无限制域上刻画了顶级交易循环（TTC），揭示了TTC与延迟接受这一匹配理论中两个经典规则之间的公理基础对应关系。我们证明，他们的刻画在单峰域上不成立，但在单谷域上即使没有策略防止性也成立。他们还表明，成对理性在其刻画中可以被关于代理人第一和第二选择的两个较弱条件所替代。相反，这种替代在单谷域上失败，即使施加了策略防止性也是如此。

英文摘要

In a recent study, Ekici and Yenmez (2026) characterize top trading cycles (TTC) on the unrestricted domain by strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and pair rationality, uncovering a correspondence between the axiomatic foundations of TTC and deferred acceptance, matching theory's two canonical rules. We show that their characterization fails on the single-peaked domain, but it holds on the single-dipped domain even without strategy-proofness. They also show that pair rationality can be replaced in their characterization by two weaker conditions concerning agents' first and second choices. In contrast, this replacement fails on the single-dipped domain, even when strategy-proofness is imposed.

发表机构

• Özyeğin University（奥兹耶金大学）
• Washington University in St. Louis（华盛顿大学圣路易斯分校）
• Durham University（杜伦大学）

机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。