大市场中的顶级交易循环：优先级的渐近无关性
Top Trading Cycles in Large Markets: The Asymptotic Irrelevance of Priorities
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中文总结 AI 辅助
研究大市场中顶级交易循环（TTC），发现在典型随机模型下，随市场规模增大，TTC中优先级优势消失，极限时其分配的合理嫉妒发生率与无视优先级的随机独裁机制相近，质疑TTC在平衡效率与公平方面的实际吸引力。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
顶级交易循环（TTC）具有帕累托效率且策略防操纵，并明确使用参与者的优先级。尽管TTC在每一轮中都偏袒高优先级参与者，但我们表明，在偏好和优先级的典型随机模型下，随着市场规模增大，这种优先级优势会消失。在极限情况下，TTC产生的分配中合理嫉妒的发生率与随机独裁机制（RSD，一种完全无视优先级的机制）几乎相同。这种明显的渐近等价性意味着TTC在大市场中实际上无法满足标准公平标准，这对其在平衡效率和公平方面的实际吸引力提出了重大质疑。
英文摘要
Top Trading Cycles (TTC) is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof and explicitly uses agents' priorities. Although TTC favors higher-priority agents in each round, we show that this priority advantage vanishes as the market grows large under a canonical random model of preferences and priorities. In the limit, TTC produces assignments with virtually the same incidence of justified envy as Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) -- a mechanism entirely blind to priorities. This stark asymptotic equivalence implies that TTC effectively fails to satisfy standard fairness criteria in large markets, casting significant doubt on its practical appeal for balancing efficiency and fairness.
