多物品再分配中的Top Trading Cycles公理
Axioms for Top Trading Cycles in Multi-Object Reallocation
AI总结：
本文研究了多物品再分配中无货币转移的Top Trading Cycles规则，通过公理化方法在不同域内刻画其效率、公平性和策略证明性特性。
摘要：
本文研究了没有货币转移的多物品再分配问题，其中代理人最初拥有多个不可分割的对象，并对物品组合有严格偏好（例如，企业内部的工人交换）。聚焦于仅 eliciting 个体物品排名的边际规则，我们为广义Top Trading Cycles规则（TTC）在词汇域和响应域上提供了公理化刻画。在词汇域上，TTC由平衡性、个体物品效率、最差初始下限、以及截断证明性或放弃策略证明性所刻画。在响应域上，TTC是唯一满足个体物品效率、截断证明性和最差初始下限或个体理性性的边际规则。在Shapley-Scarf住房市场中，TTC由帕累托效率、个体理性和截断证明性所刻画。最后，在条件词汇域上，增强的Top Trading Cycles规则由平衡性、帕累托效率、最差初始下限和放弃策略证明性所刻画。条件词汇域是帕累托效率与个体物品效率相等的最大域。
英文摘要：
This paper studies multi-object reallocation without monetary transfers, where agents initially own multiple indivisible objects and have strict preferences over bundles (e.g., shift exchange among workers at a firm). Focusing on marginal rules that elicit only rankings over individual objects, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the generalized Top Trading Cycles rule (TTC) on the lexicographic and responsive domains. On the lexicographic domain, TTC is characterized by balancedness, individual-good efficiency, the worst-endowment lower bound, and either truncation-proofness or drop strategy-proofness. On the responsive domain, TTC is the unique marginal rule satisfying individual-good efficiency, truncation-proofness, and either the worst-endowment lower bound or individual rationality. In the Shapley--Scarf housing market, TTC is characterized by Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and truncation-proofness. Finally, on the conditionally lexicographic domain, the augmented Top Trading Cycles rule is characterized by balancedness, Pareto efficiency, the worst-endowment lower bound, and drop strategy-proofness. The conditionally lexicographic domain is a maximal domain on which Pareto efficiency coincides with individual-good efficiency.
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