发表机构
Özyeğin University; Washington University in St. Louis; Durham University（Özyeğin大学; 圣路易斯华盛顿大学; 杜伦大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文证明婚姻问题中的延迟接受与对象再分配中的顶级交易循环共享相同的公理基础，并表明个体理性、配对理性和策略证明性唯一刻画TTC，弱理性要求在有交换循环上限时排除策略证明实施。
AI 中文摘要
匹配理论主要围绕两个经典规则发展：婚姻问题中的延迟接受（DA）和对象再分配问题中的顶级交易循环（TTC）。尽管这两个规则通过不同的程序运作，但我们表明它们建立在共同的基础公理之上。在婚姻问题中，稳定性分解为个体理性和配对理性，一个经典结果通过这两个公理加上提议方的策略证明性来刻画DA。我们表明，个体理性、配对理性和策略证明性同样刻画了TTC。更强烈地，三个关于个体和配对的弱理性公理，加上策略证明性，唯一确定了TTC。因此，即使弱理性要求，在交换循环规模有上限时，也排除了策略证明的实施。
英文摘要
Matching theory has largely evolved around two canonical rules: deferred acceptance (DA) in the marriage problem and top trading cycles (TTC) in the object reallocation problem. Although the two rules operate through different procedures, we show that they rest on a common axiomatic foundation. In the marriage problem, stability decomposes into individual rationality and pair rationality, and a classic result characterizes DA by these two axioms together with strategy-proofness for the proposing side. We show that individual rationality, pair rationality, and strategy-proofness likewise characterize TTC. More strongly, three weak rationality axioms concerning individuals and pairs, together with strategy-proofness, uniquely determine TTC. Even weak rationality requirements therefore rule out strategy-proof implementation when there is a cap on the size of exchange cycles.
Comments27 pages, 1 table. JEL Classification: C78, D47, D78
