固定优先级交易周期的简单优势
Simple dominance of fixed priority top trading cycles
摘要：
我们研究了在分配问题的背景下，通过简单的主导机制（Pycia和Troyan，2019）实现固定优先级交易周期（FPTTC）规则，其中代理人最多被分配一个不可分割的对象，并且不允许货币转移。我们认为这两种模式-有和没有外部选项，并在这两种模式中的所有简单占主导地位的FPTTC规则的特征。我们进一步引入了简单的防策略的概念来解决代理人关心的问题，有时间不一致的偏好，并讨论了它与简单的优势。
英文摘要：
We study the implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles (FPTTC) rules via simply dominant mechanisms (Pycia and Troyan, 2019) in the context of assignment problems, where agents are to be assigned at most one indivisible object and monetary transfers are not allowed. We consider both models - with and without outside options, and characterize all simply dominant FPTTC rules in both models. We further introduce the notion of simple strategy-proofness to resolve the issue with agents being concerned about having time-inconsistent preferences, and discuss its relation with simple dominance.
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