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arXiv 2501.04241econ.TH
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捆绑式学校选择

Bundled School Choice

Center for Economic Research, Shandong University(山东大学经济研究中心);Institute for Social and Economic Research, Nanjing Audit University(南京审计大学社会经济研究所)

Lingbo Huang, Jun Zhang

AI总结:

本文提出捆绑式学校选择机制,通过层次化捆绑组提升匹配效率与福利,同时保持公平性。

摘要:

本文提出了一种新的学校选择系统,其中学校被分为层次化的捆绑组,并作为学生偏好报告的选项提供。通过列出一个捆绑组,学生可以申请其中的任何学校而不必对学校进行排序。这种方法帮助那些难以精确排序学校的学生成为,同时在有限的偏好列表中扩展选项,可能提高匹配结果。我们设计了一种修改的延迟接受机制来处理捆绑报告,同时保持稳定性。两个实验室实验支持我们的理论,显示精心设计的捆绑组与学生偏好一致可以提高福利和匹配率而不损害公平性。讨论了实际应用。

英文摘要:

This paper proposes a novel school choice system where schools are grouped into hierarchical bundles and offered to students as options for preference reports. By listing a bundle, a student seeks admission to any school within it without ranking the schools. This approach helps students who struggle to rank schools precisely and expands options on limited preference lists, potentially improving match outcomes. We design a modified deferred acceptance mechanism to handle bundle reports while preserving stability. Two laboratory experiments support our theory, showing that well-constructed bundles aligned with student preferences enhance welfare and match rates without compromising fairness. Practical applications are discussed.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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