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arXiv 2204.07255econ.TH
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学校选择中防策略性的代价

The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice

Josue Ortega, Thilo Klein

AI总结:

本文比较了DA、TTC与排名最小化机制(RM)在学校选择中的分配结果,发现RM在排名效率、最差学生安置及减少正当嫉妒方面均显著优于前两者,并经布达佩斯数据验证。

摘要:

我们比较了最突出的防策略且稳定算法(延迟接受机制,DA)和最突出的防策略且帕累托最优算法(顶级交易循环机制,TTC)的结果与排名最小化机制(RM)生成的分配结果。虽然人们会期望RM在排名效率方面优于DA和TTC,但改善的幅度仍然令人惊讶。此外,虽然RM并未被明确设计用于此目的,但它也显著改善了最差学生的安置情况。而且,RM比TTC产生更少的正当嫉妒。我们使用布达佩斯学校招生的数据证实了我们的发现。

英文摘要:

We compare the outcomes of the most prominent strategy-proof and stable algorithm (Deferred Acceptance, DA) and the most prominent strategy-proof and Pareto optimal algorithm (Top Trading Cycles, TTC) to the allocation generated by the rank-minimizing mechanism (RM). While one would expect that RM improves upon both DA and TTC in terms of rank efficiency, the size of the improvement is nonetheless surprising. Moreover, while it is not explicitly designed to do so, RM also significantly improves the placement of the worst-off student. Furthermore, RM generates less justified envy than TTC. We corroborate our findings using data on school admissions in Budapest.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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