集值中位数投票的联盟操纵

中文摘要 AI 辅助

我们研究单峰域上区间值中位数对应关系的联盟操纵问题。在悲观扩展下，群体策略防卫性排除了任何真正的集值选择；相比之下，在乐观和最佳-最差扩展下，群体策略防卫性刻画了目标集对应关系。此外，最多两名选民的联盟足以支撑不可能性与刻画结果，因此联盟稳健性严格限制但未消除集值灵活性。

英文摘要

We study coalitional manipulation of interval-valued social choice correspondences on the single-peaked domain. In the single-valued model, strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness coincide within the standard class of peaks-only social choice functions, so generalized median voter rules retain their robustness to coalitional manipulation. This equivalence breaks down once the outcome is allowed to be set-valued: generalized median correspondences may be strategy-proof while remaining vulnerable to coordinated deviations. We show that, among generalized median correspondences allowing genuine set-valued choice, pairwise strategy-proofness already forces anonymity. With voter sovereignty, this restriction becomes sharp and characterizes target set correspondences. Thus, the target-set structure emerges as the form of set-valued flexibility compatible with pairwise coalitional robustness.

发表机构

• Undergraduate School of Management, Department of Business Economics, Tokyo University of Science（东京理科大学经营管理学部商业经济系）

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