二元社会选择的序贯一致同意投票规则
Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice
AI总结：
本文提出序贯一致同意投票规则，证明其与Moulin的M-获胜联盟规则形式等价，并由此说明该规则可由中立性与防策略性刻画，同时将分析扩展至允许选民无差异的完整偏好域。
摘要：
我们考虑一组需要在两位候选人之间做出决定的选民。我们提出了一类新的中性且防策略的规则，称之为序贯一致同意规则。通过证明这些规则与Moulin（1983）的M-获胜联盟规则在形式上的等价性，我们表明序贯一致同意规则可由中立性和防策略性刻画。我们通过开发算法来建立这些结果，这些算法能够将给定的M-获胜联盟规则转换为等价的序贯一致同意规则，反之亦然。该分析可以扩展以适应选民可能在候选人之间无差异的完整偏好域。
英文摘要：
We consider a group of voters that needs to decide between two candidates. We propose a novel family of neutral and strategy-proof rules, which we call sequential unanimity rules. By demonstrating their formal equivalence to the M-winning coalition rules of Moulin (1983), we show that sequential unanimity rules are characterized by neutrality and strategy-proofness. We establish our results by developing algorithms that transform a given M-winning coalition rule into an equivalent sequential unanimity rule and vice versa. The analysis can be extended to accommodate the full preference domain in which voters may be indifferent between candidates.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
