延迟接受的市场设计:政策制定的秘诀
Market Design with Deferred Acceptance: A Recipe for Policymaking
摘要:
我们引入了一种方法,从机构的选择规则(或优先级规则)的表征,Gale-Shapley延迟接受(DA)匹配规则的基础上,这些选择规则的表征。我们应用我们的方法在智利的学校选择,在那里我们设计的选择规则的学校,是唯一兼容的学校包容法,并得出一组匹配的属性,兼容的法律,其特点是DA规则的基础上设计的选择规则。我们的方法为建立这样的结果提供了一个配方,可以帮助政策制定者决定在实践中使用哪种分配规则。
英文摘要:
We introduce a method to derive from a characterization of institutional choice rules (or priority rules), a characterization of the Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance (DA) matching rule based on these choice rules. We apply our method to school choice in Chile, where we design choice rules for schools that are uniquely compatible with the School Inclusion Law and derive a set of matching properties, compatible with the law, that characterizes the DA rule based on the designed choice rules. Our method provides a recipe for establishing such results and can help policymakers decide on which allocation rule to use in practice.
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