学校选择中基于排名的优先级的局限性

中文摘要 AI 辅助

许多学校选择机制赋予学生在其排名靠前的学校更高的优先级，旨在奖励学生的积极性。本文研究集中机制能否在保持真实报告的同时纳入此类基于排名的优先级。我考虑一种机制，该机制同时规定了报告偏好如何修改学校的原始优先级，以及如何基于修改后的优先级确定分配结果。我要求修改规则满足排名单调性，并且由此产生的匹配相对于修改后的优先级是稳定的。这两个要求共同体现了奖励积极性的政策目标。我的主要结果表明，任何满足这些要求以及策略证明性的机制，其结果等价于使用原始优先级的学生提议的延迟接受机制。因此，如果积极性影响结果而基于排名的政策目标得以维持，则该机制必定是可操纵的。

英文摘要

Many school choice mechanisms give students higher priority at schools they rank highly and aim to reward students' eagerness. This paper studies whether a centralized mechanism can incorporate such rank-dependent priorities while preserving truthful reporting. I consider a mechanism that jointly specifies how reported preferences modify schools' original priorities and how assignments are determined based on the modified priorities. I require the modification rule to satisfy rank monotonicity and the resulting matching to be stable with respect to the modified priorities. These two requirements jointly capture the policy objective of rewarding eagerness. My main result shows that any mechanism satisfying these requirements as well as strategy-proofness is outcome equivalent to the student-proposing Deferred Acceptance mechanism using the original priorities. Thus, if eagerness affects the outcome while the rank-dependent policy goal is maintained, the mechanism must be manipulable.

发表机构

• Graduate School of Economics, the University of Tokyo（东京大学大学院经济学研究科）

机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。