带有申诉的学校选择

中文摘要 AI 辅助

每年约有五万个英国家庭通过一个集中且研究不足的程序对其学校分配结果提出申诉，该程序改善了约五分之一的申诉人的安置情况。本文表明，申诉并非制度上的事后补充：它们改变了家长向教育当局报告偏好的方式以及该程序所产生的安置质量。一旦纳入申诉阶段，即时接受（IA）变得不那么可操纵，并且能够支持在真实报告下帕累托优于延迟接受（DA）的均衡结果，从而逆转了DA-IA的福利比较。在一项预注册的实验中，我们发现了与理论预测一致的结果：申诉增加了IA中的真实报告行为，而DA基本保持不变，并扩大了IA-DA的效率差距。约60%的IA效率提升出现在任何申诉被支持之前，因为预期到潜在申诉可能性的受试者会以不同的方式对学校进行排序。

英文摘要

Roughly fifty thousand families in England appeal their school assignments each year through a centralized and understudied procedure that improves the placement of about one in five claimants. This paper shows that appeals are not an institutional afterthought: they change how parents report preferences to the education authority and the quality of placements it generates. Once the appeal stage is incorporated, Immediate Acceptance (IA) becomes less manipulable and can support equilibrium outcomes that Pareto dominate those of Deferred Acceptance (DA) under truth-telling, reversing the DA-IA welfare comparison. In a preregistered experiment, we find results consistent with the theoretical predictions: appeals increase truth-telling in IA, leaving DA essentially unchanged, and widen the IA-DA efficiency gap. Around 60% of the IA efficiency gain appears before any appeal is upheld, because subjects anticipating the possibility of a potential appeal rank schools differently.

发表机构

• City St George’s, University of London（伦敦大学城市圣乔治学院）
• University of Zurich（苏黎世大学）
• Queen’s University Belfast（贝尔法斯特女王大学）

机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。