发表机构
Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow（亚当·斯密商学院，格拉斯哥大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文研究区间上的单峰偏好下的防策略投票方案，提出左右方案为唯一防策略方案，加匿名性简化为广义中位数方案，奇数代理人时中位数方案唯一满足效率、匿名性和防策略性。
AI 中文摘要
当允许选择一组备选方案作为集体选择时，一种方法是研究定义在代理人偏好之上的社会选择对应关系。本文考虑了一种不同的方法。我们认为代理人应该直接对结果有偏好。我们在一个封闭的实数区间上考虑社会选择问题，并假设区间上的单峰偏好域。我们关注的是仅依赖于峰值的函数，称为投票方案。左右方案，它推广了最小最大方案，是唯一的防策略投票方案。加上匿名性，它简化为广义中位数方案。对于奇数个代理人，中位数方案是唯一满足效率、匿名性和防策略性的投票方案。
英文摘要
When a subset of alternatives is allowed to be the collective choice, one approach is to study the social choice correspondence defined on agents' preferences over alternatives. This paper considers a different approach. We argue that agents should have preferences directly over outcomes. We consider the social choice problem on a closed real interval, and assume a single-peaked domain over intervals. Our focus is on the peak-only social choice function, referred to as the voting scheme. The leftright scheme, which generalizes the minmax scheme, is the only strategy-proof voting scheme. Adding anonymity, it reduces to the generalized median scheme. For an odd number of agents, the median scheme is the only voting scheme satisfying efficiency, anonymity, and strategy-proofness.
