从社会选择问题到动态随机项目的防合谋招标机制
From the Social Choice Problem to a Collusion-Proof Tendering Mechanism for Dynamic Stochastic Projects
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中文总结 AI 辅助
该文针对静态社会选择问题中 AGV 机制的缺陷，提出可转移效用保障效用机制（TU-GUM），其适用于动态随机项目且具防合谋性，还总结关联相关成果并补充新观察。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
VCG 族与 AGV 机制是静态社会选择问题中实现高效实施的两种经典方法。2024 年，Csóka 等人指出 AGV 存在关键缺陷。相比之下，可转移效用保障效用机制（TU-GUM）保留了 AGV 的所有标准优良特性，同时新增防合谋性等特性，因其能在保障效用均衡中实现高效。TU-GUM 还适用于含多种扩展的更一般动态场景。此外，TU-GUM 是更通用且稳健机制的特例，该机制将或有第一价格招标与动态随机多智能体项目的协同执行相结合，规则极为简单。本文从不同视角总结并关联现有成果，附带少量新观察。
英文摘要
The VCG family and the AGV mechanism are two classical approaches to efficient implementation in the static social choice problem. In 2024, Csóka et al. showed that AGV has critical weaknesses. In contrast, the transferable-utility Guaranteed Utility Mechanism (TU-GUM) retains all the standard desirable properties of AGV while adding further ones, including collusion-proofness, because it implements efficiency in Guaranteed Utility Equilibrium. TU-GUM also applies to a more general dynamic setting with multiple extensions. Moreover, TU-GUM is a special case of an even more general and robust mechanism that combines contingent first-price tendering with the coordinated execution of dynamic stochastic multi-agent projects through a surprisingly simple rule. This paper summarizes and connects existing results from a different perspective, with some minor new observations.
发表机构
- Alfréd Rényi Institute of Mathematics（阿尔弗雷德·雷尼数学研究所）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。
