从策略性录取的免疫性比较择校与大学录取机制
Comparing School Choice and College Admission Mechanisms By Their Immunity to Strategic Admissions
摘要:
最近,世界各地的几十个学区和大学招生系统已经改革了他们的录取规则。作为这些改革的主要动机,政策制定者引用了规则的战略缺陷:学生有强烈的动机来游戏系统,这对非战略学生造成了戏剧性的后果。然而,几乎没有一条新规则是防策略的。我们来解释这个谜题。我们发现,改革后的规则变得更加免疫战略招生:每个学生收到一个较小的一组学校,他可以在使用一个策略,削弱动机操纵。与此同时,每所学校的入学对更多的学生来说是防策略性的,这使得学校更适合非策略性学生。我们还证明了Pathak和Sönmez(2013)对这个谜题的现有解释是不完整的。
英文摘要:
Recently dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the world have reformed their admission rules. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong incentives to game the system, which caused dramatic consequences for non-strategic students. However, almost none of the new rules were strategy-proof. We explain this puzzle. We show that after the reforms the rules became more immune to strategic admissions: each student received a smaller set of schools that he can get in using a strategy, weakening incentives to manipulate. Simultaneously, the admission to each school became strategy-proof to a larger set of students, making the schools more available for non-strategic students. We also show that the existing explanation of the puzzle due to Pathak and Sönmez (2013) is incomplete.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。