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arXiv 2107.01340econ.TH
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非原子招生市场的特征

Characterizing nonatomic admissions markets

Max Kapur

摘要:

本文提出了一个招生市场的特征,可以预测学生在每个学校或大学的分布下,集中和分散的招生模式。特征建立在最近的研究稳定的分配,模型的学生作为一个概率分布的顺序偏好和分数。虽然稳定的分配机制的前提是一个集中的招生过程中,我表明,稳定的分配与均衡的分散,迭代市场中,学校调整他们的招生标准,追求目标班级规模。此外,稳定分配的延迟接受算法是一种被称为tâtonnement的价格动态的特殊情况。文章的后半部分转向学生类型的参数分布,该参数分布可以明确计算均衡,并且在学校的偏好参数中是可逆的。将该模型应用于公共数据集,可以直观地对美国大学的受欢迎程度进行排名,并对每所学校的需求曲线进行现实的估计,并且这样做不需要施加均衡假设,也不需要传统逻辑回归中使用的粒度学生信息。

英文摘要:

This article proposes a characterization of admissions markets that can predict the distribution of students at each school or college under both centralized and decentralized admissions paradigms. The characterization builds on recent research in stable assignment, which models students as a probability distribution over the set of ordinal preferences and scores. Although stable assignment mechanisms presuppose a centralized admissions process, I show that stable assignments coincide with equilibria of a decentralized, iterative market in which schools adjust their admissions standards in pursuit of a target class size. Moreover, deferred acceptance algorithms for stable assignment are a special case of a well-understood price dynamic called tâtonnement. The second half of the article turns to a parametric distribution of student types that enables explicit computation of the equilibrium and is invertible in the schools' preferability parameters. Applying this model to a public dataset produces an intuitive ranking of the popularity of American universities and a realistic estimate of each school's demand curve, and does so without imposing an equilibrium assumption or requiring the granular student information used in conventional logistic regressions.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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