发表机构
National Central University（中央大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文在集中式大学招生的合约匹配框架下，提出奖学金选择规则及相关学生提出延期接受机制，分析奖学金提供的福利效应，明确共同学业成绩排名对保证奖学金提升学生群体质量的必要性与充分性。
AI 中文摘要
基于学业成绩的奖学金被广泛用于吸引学业优异的学生，但这是否能保证提升大学学生群体的学业成绩？本文在采用合约匹配框架的集中式大学招生中研究该问题。我们首先提出奖学金选择规则，该规则从最高到最低处理奖学金等级，并在每个等级中选择学业成绩最高的学生。我们证明奖学金可行性、奖学金最大化以及无正当嫉妒是该规则的唯一特征。我们进一步将基于该规则的学生提出延期接受机制刻画为唯一机制（结果等价除外），其满足三条公理的扩展，同时满足个体理性和策略完备性。随后我们研究奖学金提供的福利效应，在一般匹配市场中，大学在引入奖学金后可能匹配到学业成绩更低的学生。最后，当所有学校都使用奖学金选择规则，且每个学生都符合学校提供的所有奖学金等级的资格时，我们证明，对于满足校内单调性的每个学生偏好组合，共同学业成绩排名是奖学金提供保证提供奖学金的大学学生群体弱改善的必要且充分条件。
英文摘要
Merit-based scholarships are widely used to attract high-achieving students, but do they guarantee an improvement in the merit of a university's student pool? We study this question in centralized college admissions using a matching with contracts framework. We first introduce the scholarship choice rule, which processes scholarship levels from highest to lowest and selects the highest-merit students at each level. We show that scholarship feasibility, scholarship maximality, and no justified envy uniquely characterize this rule. We further characterize the student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism based on this rule as the unique mechanism, up to outcome equivalence, satisfying the extensions of the three axioms, together with individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. We then study the welfare effects of scholarship provision. In general matching markets, a university may be matched with lower-merit students after introducing a scholarship. Finally, when all schools use the scholarship choice rule and every student is eligible for every scholarship level a school offers, we show that a common merit ranking is necessary and sufficient for scholarship provision to guarantee, for every student-preference profile satisfying within-school monotonicity, a weak improvement in the scholarship-providing school's student pool.
