学校与大学录取中的改革与公平性关切
Reforms meet fairness concerns in school and college admissions
AI总结:
本文研究了全球学校与大学录取匹配系统的改革,证明尽管新机制仍存在阻塞性学生,但相比旧机制在稳定性和计数上更加公平,且机制公平性与可操纵性存在紧密逻辑关联。
摘要:
最近,全球许多匹配系统都进行了改革。这些改革回应了关于正在使用的匹配机制不公平且可操纵的异议。令人惊讶的是,改革后这些机制仍然不公平:新机制可能会产生一个结果,其中包含一个阻塞性学生,该学生渴望且理应获得她未能被分配的学校。然而,正如我们在本文中所展示的,与反事实情况相比,改革引入的匹配机制更加公平。首先,大多数改革引入了在稳定性方面更加公平的机制:只要旧机制没有阻塞性学生,新机制也不会有阻塞性学生。其次,一些改革引入了在计数方面更加公平的机制:旧机制总是至少拥有与新机制一样多的阻塞性学生。这些发现为改革提供了新的理论依据,并补充了近期的研究文献,这些文献表明同样的改革引入了可操纵性更低的匹配机制。我们进一步表明,机制的公平性与可操纵性在逻辑上存在紧密的关联。
英文摘要:
Recently, many matching systems around the world have been reformed. These reforms responded to objections that the matching mechanisms in use were unfair and manipulable. Surprisingly, the mechanisms remained unfair even after the reforms: the new mechanisms may induce an outcome with a blocking student who desires and deserves a school which she did not receive. However, as we show in this paper, the reforms introduced matching mechanisms which are more fair compared to the counterfactuals. First, most of the reforms introduced mechanisms that are more fair by stability: whenever the old mechanism does not have a blocking student, the new mechanism does not have a blocking student either. Second, some reforms introduced mechanisms that are more fair by counting: the old mechanism always has at least as many blocking students as the new mechanism. These findings give a novel rationale to the reforms and complement the recent literature showing that the same reforms have introduced less manipulable matching mechanisms. We further show that the fairness and manipulability of the mechanisms are strongly logically related.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。