平权行动的下游影响
Downstream Effects of Affirmative Action
摘要:
我们研究了一个两阶段模型,在这个模型中,学生1)根据入学考试被大学录取,这是一个关于他们资格(类型)的噪音信号,然后2)那些被大学录取的学生可以被雇主雇佣,作为他们大学成绩的函数,这是一个独立绘制的噪音信号。学生来自两个人群之一,这两个人群可能具有不同的类型分布。我们假设在管道末端的雇主是理性的,在这个意义上,它计算了学生类型的后验分布,条件是它拥有的所有信息(大学录取,成绩和团体成员资格),并根据后验期望做出决定。然后,我们研究了什么样的公平目标可以通过设置其招生规则和评分政策的大学。例如,学院的目标可能是保证所有人群的机会均等:通过管道并被雇主雇用的概率应该独立于群体成员,以类型为条件。或者,学院的目标可能是激励雇主制定一个群体盲目招聘规则。我们表明,这两个目标可以实现时,大学不报告成绩。另一方面,我们表明,在合理的条件下,这些目标是不可能实现的,即使在孤立的大学使用(即使是最低限度的)信息分级政策。
英文摘要:
We study a two-stage model, in which students are 1) admitted to college on the basis of an entrance exam which is a noisy signal about their qualifications (type), and then 2) those students who were admitted to college can be hired by an employer as a function of their college grades, which are an independently drawn noisy signal of their type. Students are drawn from one of two populations, which might have different type distributions. We assume that the employer at the end of the pipeline is rational, in the sense that it computes a posterior distribution on student type conditional on all information that it has available (college admissions, grades, and group membership), and makes a decision based on posterior expectation. We then study what kinds of fairness goals can be achieved by the college by setting its admissions rule and grading policy. For example, the college might have the goal of guaranteeing equal opportunity across populations: that the probability of passing through the pipeline and being hired by the employer should be independent of group membership, conditioned on type. Alternately, the college might have the goal of incentivizing the employer to have a group blind hiring rule. We show that both goals can be achieved when the college does not report grades. On the other hand, we show that under reasonable conditions, these goals are impossible to achieve even in isolation when the college uses an (even minimally) informative grading policy.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。