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arXiv 2502.08412cs.GTecon.TH
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无先验的非货币机制设计:通过自适应代价高昂审计实现效率

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Operations Research Center(麻省理工学院,运筹学中心);Georgia Tech, School of Industrial and Systems Engineering(佐治亚理工学院,工业与系统工程学院);Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of EECS(麻省理工学院,电气与计算机工程系)

Yan Dai, Moise Blanchard, Patrick Jaillet

AI总结:

针对无货币转移且无先验信息的多轮资源分配问题,提出一种通过自适应代价高昂审计激励真实报告并实现社会福利遗憾O(K^2)的机制。

摘要:

我们研究具有策略性代理人的重复资源分配问题,其中不允许货币转移,且规划者对代理人的效用分布没有先验信息。受代价高昂的状态验证文献启发,我们假设规划者可以在分配后对获胜代理人请求代价高昂的审计,揭示其真实效用,但无法撤销分配。我们设计了一种机制,在社会福利方面实现了与$T$无关的$\mathcal O(K^2)$遗憾,同时期望审计次数为$\mathcal O(K^3 \log T)$,其中$K$是代理人数量,$T$是轮数。我们进一步证明了遗憾的下界为$\Omega(K)$,以及实现低遗憾所需审计次数的下界为$\Omega(1)$。我们还将我们的机制和分析推广到不完美审计模型。在算法上,我们表明激励真实行为依赖于在线准确估计代理人的真实获胜概率。为此,我们通过自适应审计施加未来惩罚;我们还引入了一个激励一致的标记组件,允许代理人标记有偏估计,我们证明这符合他们的最佳利益。在分析上,没有分布信息时,揭示原则无法规定一个说真话的均衡。相反,我们通过归约到一个仅包含良性策略的辅助博弈来刻画一个完美贝叶斯均衡。本文开发的技术工具对于其他揭示原则不适用的鲁棒机制设计问题可能具有独立意义。

英文摘要:

We study repeated resource allocation with strategic agents, where monetary transfers are disallowed and the planner has no prior information on agents' utility distributions. Inspired by the costly state verification literature, we assume the planner can request costly audits on the winning agent after allocation, revealing their true utility but without the ability to revoke the allocation. We design a mechanism achieving $T$-independent $\mathcal O(K^2)$ regret in social welfare while requesting $\mathcal O(K^3 \log T)$ audits in expectation, where $K$ is the number of agents and $T$ is the number of rounds. We further show an $Ω(K)$ lower bound on the regret and an $Ω(1)$ lower bound on the number of audits required for low regret. We also generalize our mechanism and analysis to imperfect audit models. Algorithmically, we show that incentivizing truthful behavior relies on accurately estimating agents' truthful winning probability online. To achieve this, we impose future punishments via adaptive audits; we also introduce an incentive-aligned flagging component allowing agents to flag biased estimates, which we prove is in their best interest. Analytically, without distributional information, the revelation principle cannot dictate a truth-telling equilibrium. Instead, we characterize a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium via a reduction to an auxiliary game with only benign strategies. The technical tools developed herein can be of independent interest for other robust mechanism design problems where the revelation principle is inapplicable.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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