存在外部效应的激励设计
Incentive Design with Spillovers
AI总结：
本文研究了存在外部效应的激励设计问题，通过网络博弈方法提出最优激励分配机制，探讨了个体能力与协作性补偿及互补性对支付分散的影响。
摘要：
一个委托人通过支付条件于团队项目随机结果来激发团队成员的成本努力。我们通过利用网络博弈的方法，开发了一个多智能体的经典第一阶合同优化方法的推广。主要结果刻画了激励支付在不同代理和结果上的最优分配。激励最优要求在不同代理之间相等化个体生产力、组织中心性和对货币激励的响应性三者的乘积。我们专门研究该模型以探讨几个应用问题，包括补偿是否应奖励个人能力或协作性，以及互补性强度如何影响支付分散程度。
英文摘要：
A principal uses payments conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit costly effort from the team members. We develop a multi-agent generalization of a classic first-order approach to contract optimization by leveraging methods from network games. The main results characterize the optimal allocation of incentive pay across agents and outcomes. Incentive optimality requires equalizing, across agents, a product of (i) individual productivity (ii) organizational centrality and (iii) responsiveness to monetary incentives. We specialize the model to explore several applied questions, including whether compensation should reward individual ability or collaborativeness and how the strength of complementarities shapes pay dispersion.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
