一般化委托-代理问题中交互团队的均衡机制存在性
Interacting Principal-Agent Games
AI总结：
研究多代理人在存在战略外溢的环境中同时设计机制时，通过跟踪诚实服从路径上的结果分布和单方面偏离可实现的结果分布，建立均衡存在的通用条件。
摘要：
我们研究当多个委托人同时为各自团队设计机制时的激励设计问题，在存在战略外溢的环境中，每个委托人的激励相容机制集取决于其他团队提供的机制。根据Myerson(1982)的经典例子，此类游戏可能因激励相容机制对应关系的不连续性而缺乏均衡。我们通过引入一种新方法，跟踪诚实服从路径上的结果分布以及通过单方面偏离可实现的结果分布集，从而为分析广泛范围的多委托人机制设计问题提供了基础。
英文摘要：
In many economic environments, multiple principals simultaneously design incentive systems while interacting strategically with one another. The resulting incentive constraints are interdependent: whether a mechanism is incentive compatible for one principal may depend on the mechanisms chosen by the other principals. This interdependence makes exact equilibrium fragile: small changes in one principal's mechanism can alter the incentive-compatible mechanisms available to others. We establish two complementary equilibrium-existence results. First, for environments with multidimensional type, action, and outcome spaces, we show that, for every $\varepsilon>0$, there exists a Bayesian-Nash principals' equilibrium under $\varepsilon$-relaxed incentive compatibility: principals best respond exactly over mechanisms whose agents' ex ante expected deviation regret is at most $\varepsilon$. Thus equilibrium existence can be recovered with arbitrarily small expected incentive regret. In contrast to Myerson's quasi-equilibrium, which keeps incentive compatibility exact but relaxes the principals' optimality requirement, this concept keeps principals' optimization exact and relaxes the agents' incentive constraints. Second, motivated by Myerson's nonexistence example, in which each principal has a single privately informed agent, we examine a one-member team-contest specialization of the general model with voluntary participation. This specialization retains the basic structure of Myerson's setting (competing principals, privately informed agents, and interdependent incentive constraints) while imposing primitive conditions under which exact feasibility varies continuously. In this environment, we establish existence of an exact Bayesian-Nash principals' equilibrium.
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