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arXiv 2601.10048econ.TH
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多发送者披露与成本

Multi-Sender Disclosure with Costs

Yale University(耶鲁大学);Columbia University(哥伦比亚大学);Quinlan School of Business, Loyola University Chicago(洛约拉芝加哥大学奎恩商学院);Faculty of Business and Economics, The University of Hong Kong(香港大学工商管理学院)

Navin Kartik, Frances Xu Lee, Wing Suen

AI总结:

本文研究了多个存在偏见的发送者在披露和隐瞒成本下的战略互动,揭示了额外发送者对披露行为的影响取决于成本类型。

摘要:

我们研究了多个存在偏见的发送者自愿披露信息的问题,这些发送者可能因披露或隐瞒其私人信息而承担成本。在相关假设下,披露成本下披露是战略替代品,而在隐瞒成本下是战略互补品。额外的发送者因此在披露成本下阻碍任何发送者的披露,但在隐瞒成本下促进它。在前者情况下,决策者可能因额外的发送者而受损,即使发送者有对立的利益。两种信息成本下的影响取决于发送者在隐瞒信息时,如何系统性地影响决策者的信念。

英文摘要:

We study voluntary disclosure with multiple biased senders who may bear costs for disclosing or concealing their private information. Under relevant assumptions, disclosures are strategic substitutes under a disclosure cost but complements under a concealment cost. Additional senders thus impede any sender's disclosure under a disclosure cost but promote it under a concealment cost. In the former case, a decision maker can be harmed by additional senders, even when senders have opposing interests. The effects under both kinds of message costs turn on how a sender, when concealing his information, expects others' messages to systematically sway the decision maker's belief.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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