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arXiv 1707.04699econ.GNecon.THq-fin.EC
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好的信号变坏了:动态信号与切换努力

Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with switching efforts

Research School of Economics, Australian National University(澳大利亚国立大学经济研究学院)

Sander Heinsalu

AI总结:

本文研究动态信号中发送者随时间投入努力并获得收益的情况,接收者仅观察到关于努力的噪声公共信号。动态建模产生新的均衡结果,某些均衡中高成本发送者比低成本者投入更多努力,低成本类型可后期补偿初期低努力,但高成本类型不值得。

摘要:

本文研究了发送者在时间上投入努力并获得收益时的信号问题。接收者只能观察到一个噪声性的公共信号,该信号本身没有内在价值。在动态背景下建模信号产生新的均衡结果。在某些均衡中,高成本发送者比低成本发送者投入更多努力。低成本类型可后期补偿初期低努力,但对高成本类型来说不值得。给定信号的解释会随时间内生地切换,取决于接收者预期发送信号的类型。JEL分类:D82, D83, C73。关键词:动态博弈,信号,信息不完全

英文摘要:

This paper examines signalling when the sender exerts effort and receives benefits over time. Receivers only observe a noisy public signal about the effort, which has no intrinsic value. The modelling of signalling in a dynamic context gives rise to novel equilibrium outcomes. In some equilibria, a sender with a higher cost of effort exerts strictly more effort than his low-cost counterpart. The low-cost type can compensate later for initial low effort, but this is not worthwhile for a high-cost type. The interpretation of a given signal switches endogenously over time, depending on which type the receivers expect to send it. JEL classification: D82, D83, C73. Keywords: Dynamic games, signalling , incomplete information

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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