动态证据披露:延迟好消息以加速坏消息披露
Dynamic Evidence Disclosure: Delay the Good to Accelerate the Bad
AI总结:
针对新技术采纳中的信息搭便车问题,本文研究证据生成与披露的动态权衡,提出延迟披露好消息、及时披露坏消息的最优政策,可加快技术采纳并提升所有智能体福利。
摘要:
我们分析了证据生成与披露之间的动态权衡。智能体倾向于推迟对新技术的投资,以便从他人经验产生的信息中学习,这种信息搭便车行为会拖慢学习和创新采纳速度,对集体有害。追求福利最大化的设计者可延迟披露此前生成的信息以加快技术采纳,最优政策是透明披露坏消息、延迟披露好消息。该发现与要求立即报告致命故障的监管规定相契合,设计者的干预能让所有智能体获益。
英文摘要:
We analyze the dynamic tradeoff between generating and disclosing evidence. Agents are tempted to delay investing in a new technology in order to learn from information generated by the experiences of others. This informational free-riding is collectively harmful as it slows down learning and innovation adoption. A welfare-maximizing designer can delay the disclosure of previously generated information in order to speed up adoption. The optimal policy transparently discloses bad news and delays good news. This finding resonates with regulation demanding that fatal breakdowns be reported promptly. The designer's intervention makes all agents better off.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。