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arXiv 2210.08294econ.TH
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设置临时期限以说服

Setting Interim Deadlines to Persuade

Maxim Senkov

摘要:

委托人为一个多阶段的项目提供资金,如果项目在某个时候停滞不前,委托人保留削减资金的权利。代理人希望说服委托人尽可能长时间地为项目提供资金,并且可以设计有关项目进度的信息流,以便说服委托人。如果项目在事前就有足够的前景,那么代理人承诺只提供项目完成的好消息。如果项目在事前没有足够的前景,代理人会说服委托人开始提供资金,承诺不仅提供好消息,还提供坏消息,即项目的里程碑在临时截止日期前没有达到。我证明了最优信息披露的概述结构,无论代理人的利润份额,受益于资金流,和共同的贴现率。

英文摘要:

A principal funds a multistage project and retains the right to cut the funding if it stagnates at some point. An agent wants to convince the principal to fund the project as long as possible, and can design the flow of information about the progress of the project in order to persuade the principal. If the project is sufficiently promising ex ante, then the agent commits to providing only the good news that the project is accomplished. If the project is not promising enough ex ante, the agent persuades the principal to start the funding by committing to provide not only good news but also the bad news that a project milestone has not been reached by an interim deadline. I demonstrate that the outlined structure of optimal information disclosure holds irrespective of the agent's profit share, benefit from the flow of funding, and the common discount rate.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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