发表机构
Kelley School of Business, Indiana University; Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh（印第安纳大学凯利商学院; 匹兹堡大学经济学系）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
研究时间戳对动态披露的影响：带时间戳时均衡为好消息立即披露、坏消息按时间戳延迟；不带时间戳时，高先验与不耐烦产生未披露好消息存量并被随机清除，时间戳通过防止伪装和证明旧证据来加速好消息披露并促进坏消息披露。
AI 中文摘要
我们研究时间戳如何影响动态披露。在一个随机日期，发送者私下获得关于一个演化中的二元状态的硬证据，并选择何时披露它。带时间戳时，唯一均衡的特征是：好消息证据立即披露，坏消息证据则根据时间戳延迟披露。不带时间戳时，相对于不耐烦程度较高的先验会产生未披露的好消息证据存量，该存量在永久透明之前被随机清除。高度不耐烦导致好消息证据立即披露，而坏消息证据可以被任意延迟并以突发方式披露。时间戳防止将旧的好消息证据伪装成新的，并证明坏消息证据是旧的，从而加速好消息证据的披露并促进坏消息证据的披露。
英文摘要
We study how timestamps affect dynamic disclosure. At a random date, a sender privately obtains hard evidence about an evolving binary state and chooses when to disclose it. With timestamps, the unique equilibrium features immediate good-evidence disclosure and timestamp-dependent bad-evidence delay. Without timestamps, high priors relative to impatience generate a stock of undisclosed good evidence, which is stochastically purged before permanent transparency. High impatience yields immediate good-evidence disclosure, while bad evidence can be arbitrarily delayed and disclosed in bursts. Timestamps prevent pretending old good evidence is fresh and certify bad evidence is old, accelerating good-evidence disclosure and facilitating bad-evidence disclosure.
