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arXiv 2006.05330cs.GTecon.TH
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加权博弈对于二元投票来说足够好吗?

Are weighted games sufficiently good for binary voting?

Sascha Kurz

摘要:

立法委员会或股东大会上的二元是非决策通常被建模为加权博弈。然而,也有值得注意的例外。例如,在一个示例中,欧洲理事会根据《里斯本条约》的投票规则使用了更复杂的结构。在这里,我们想研究的问题,如果我们失去了很多从实际的角度来看,如果我们限制自己的加权游戏。为此,我们调用权力指数,衡量二元决策委员会的成员的影响力。更确切地说,我们比较加权游戏的可实现的权力分布与加权游戏的合理超集。事实证明,偏差相对较小。

英文摘要:

Binary yes-no decisions in a legislative committee or a shareholder meeting are commonly modeled as a weighted game. However, there are noteworthy exceptions. E.g., the voting rules of the European Council according to the Treaty of Lisbon use a more complicated construction. Here we want to study the question if we lose much from a practical point of view, if we restrict ourselves to weighted games. To this end, we invoke power indices that measure the influence of a member in binary decision committees. More precisely, we compare the achievable power distributions of weighted games with those from a reasonable superset of weighted games. It turns out that the deviation is relatively small.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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