arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1905.04261cs.GTmath.PRphysics.soc-ph
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加权投票对策中的平均权与幂

Average Weights and Power in Weighted Voting Games

Daria Boratyn, Werner Kirsch, Wojciech Słomczyński, Dariusz Stolicki, Karol Życzkowski

摘要:

研究了一类权重随机分布在标准概率单纯形上的加权投票博弈。在均匀分布下,给出了$k$ -次最大局中人的权重分布的期望和密度的闭式公式。我们分析了平均投票权的$k$ -第一大玩家和它的依赖于配额,获得分析和数值结果小值的$n$和一般定理之间的关系的函数形式的平均彭罗斯-Banzhaf权力指数和配额的统一措施的单纯形。我们还分析了权力的集体行动(科尔曼效率指数)的随机加权投票游戏,获得分析上限。

英文摘要:

We investigate a class of weighted voting games for which weights are randomly distributed over the standard probability simplex. We provide close-formed formulae for the expectation and density of the distribution of weight of the $k$-th largest player under the uniform distribution. We analyze the average voting power of the $k$-th largest player and its dependence on the quota, obtaining analytical and numerical results for small values of $n$ and a general theorem about the functional form of the relation between the average Penrose--Banzhaf power index and the quota for the uniform measure on the simplex. We also analyze the power of a collectivity to act (Coleman efficiency index) of random weighted voting games, obtaining analytical upper bounds therefor.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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