Parrondo对策中投票的无效性
Inefficiency of voting in Parrondo games
摘要：
我们研究了所谓的Parrondo悖论的修改，其中大量的个人选择的游戏，他们想玩投票。我们发现，它可以更好地为球员投票随机比投票，根据自己的利益在一个回合。前者产生赢的趋势，而后者导致稳定的损失。对这种行为的解释是，注意到自私的投票阻止了游戏之间的切换，这对总资本的增长至关重要。有限和无限多的球员的结果。结果表明，该模型的扩展历史依赖的Parrondo悖论也显示出同样的效果。
英文摘要：
We study a modification of the so-called Parrondo's paradox where a large number of individuals choose the game they want to play by voting. We show that it can be better for the players to vote randomly than to vote according to their own benefit in one turn. The former yields a winning tendency while the latter results in steady losses. An explanation of this behaviour is given by noting that selfish voting prevents the switching between games that is essential for the total capital to grow. Results for both finite and infinite number of players are presented. It is shown that the extension of the model to the history-dependent Parrondo's paradox also displays the same effect.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
