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arXiv 1408.0442cs.GT
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随机加权投票中的权力分布:随机数的影响

Power Distribution in Randomized Weighted Voting: the Effects of the Quota

Joel Oren, Yuval Filmus, Yair Zick, Yoram Bachrach

摘要:

研究了加权投票博弈中的Shapley值问题。Shapley值已被用作衡量决策机构和政治组织中个体代理人权力的指标,其中决策是通过多数投票程序做出的。我们描述了改变配额的影响(即,形成联盟所需的议会中的最小席位数)对代理的Shapley值的影响。与以前的研究,假设代理权重(对应于党团或政党的大小)是固定的,我们分析了新的域中的权重随机生成,建模,例如,选举过程。我们研究了一个自然的权重生成过程:球和箱模型,具有均匀和指数衰减的概率。我们还分析了权重,承认一个超级增加的序列,回答了几个悬而未决的问题,在这样的游戏中的Shapley值。

英文摘要:

We study the Shapley value in weighted voting games. The Shapley value has been used as an index for measuring the power of individual agents in decision-making bodies and political organizations, where decisions are made by a majority vote process. We characterize the impact of changing the quota (i.e., the minimum number of seats in the parliament that are required to form a coalition) on the Shapley values of the agents. Contrary to previous studies, which assumed that the agent weights (corresponding to the size of a caucus or a political party) are fixed, we analyze new domains in which the weights are stochastically generated, modelling, for example, elections processes. We examine a natural weight generation process: the Balls and Bins model, with uniform as well as exponentially decaying probabilities. We also analyze weights that admit a super-increasing sequence, answering several open questions pertaining to the Shapley values in such games.

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