代币策划注册-博弈论方法
Token Curated Registries - A Game Theoretic Approach
摘要：
最近有人提出了代币管理注册表（TCR），作为一种以去中心化方式创建和维护高质量资源或建议列表的方法。应用范围从维护用于广告目的的web域的注册表（例如，注册表通过需要令牌存款的候选应用程序、基于令牌抵押的挑战和令牌加权投票的组合来维护，其中令牌的重新分配作为投票的结果发生。我们提出了一个简化的数学模型的TCR和它的挑战和投票过程分析从博弈论的角度。我们得到一些见解的条件下，一个候选人的质量发生的挑战，并根据其结果是拒绝或接受。我们还表明，在某些条件下，结果可能是不完全可预测的意义上说，每个人都投票接受和每个人都投票拒绝可能都是纳什均衡的结果。对于这样的条件，我们还探讨了一个特定的战略配置文件时，可能是收益占主导地位。我们确定的方式，我们的建模可以扩展，也有一些影响，我们的模型与TCR的组成。
英文摘要：
Token curated registries (TCRs) have been proposed recently as an approach to create and maintain high quality lists of resources or recommendations in a decentralized manner. Applications range from maintaining registries of web domains for advertising purposes (e.g., adChain) or restaurants, consumer products, etc. The registry is maintained through a combination of candidate applications requiring a token deposit, challenges based on token staking and token-weighted votes with a redistribution of tokens occurring as a consequence of the vote. We present a simplified mathematical model of a TCR and its challenge and voting process analyze it from a game-theoretic perspective. We derive some insights into conditions with respect to the quality of a candidate under which challenges occur, and under which the outcome is reject or accept. We also show that there are conditions under which the outcome may not be entirely predictable in the sense that everyone voting for accept and everyone voting for reject could both be Nash Equilibria outcomes. For such conditions, we also explore when a particular strategy profile may be payoff dominant. We identify ways in which our modeling can be extended and also some implications of our model with respect to the composition of TCRs.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
