无信任溯源树：一种基于博弈论的操作符门控区块链注册表框架
Trustless Provenance Trees: A Game-Theoretic Framework for Operator-Gated Blockchain Registries
AI总结：
本文提出无信任溯源树框架，通过双层加密承诺方案解决操作符信任问题，并分析树污染攻击，证明需要三种机制保障溯源树完整性。
摘要：
我们对溯源树进行了形式化处理，即以公共区块链不可变锚定的有向无环图形式表示artifact注册，并引入操作符信任问题：当单个特权操作符代表用户提交所有链上注册时，链上记录无法区分用户发起的注册与单方面操作符行为。我们通过双层加密承诺方案解决此问题，该方案基于单个客户端密钥生成两个承诺，将密钥绑定到树根和每个唯一注册标识符，使虚假归属声明成为严格占优策略。我们在标准密码学假设下证明了正确性，并在不依赖操作符信任的情况下，确立诚实行为为唯一纳什均衡。我们进一步引入并分析树污染问题：通过欺诈性根注册、恶意子节点附加和树身份欺骗对用户溯源树发起对抗攻击。我们刻画每种攻击变体的闭包性质，并证明完整的溯源树完整性模型需要三种不同的机制：密码学优先级、治理级联和合同执行，每种都是必要的，但单独不足以满足要求。该构造部署在Base（以太坊L2）上作为AnchorRegistry，一个不可变的链上溯源注册表。我们提供了气体复杂度分析，证明其成本为O(1)，与注册表规模无关，并提供了一个无信任重建算法，仅通过公共事件日志即可恢复完整的注册表。
英文摘要：
We present a formal treatment of provenance trees, directed acyclic graphs of artifact registrations anchored immutably on a public blockchain, and introduce the operator trust problem: when a single privileged operator submits all on-chain registrations on behalf of users, the on-chain record alone cannot distinguish user-initiated registrations from unilateral operator actions. We resolve this through a dual-layer cryptographic commitment scheme in which two commitments derived from a single client-side secret key, binding the key to the tree root and to each unique registration identifier, make false attribution claims strictly dominated strategies. We prove correctness under standard cryptographic assumptions and establish honest behavior as the unique Nash equilibrium without relying on operator trust. We further introduce and analyze the tree poisoning problem: adversarial attacks on users' provenance trees via fraudulent root registration, malicious child attachment, and tree identity spoofing. We characterize the closure properties of each attack variant and prove that a complete provenance tree integrity model requires three distinct mechanisms: cryptographic priority, governance cascade, and contract enforcement, each necessary and none individually sufficient. The construction is deployed on Base (Ethereum L2) as AnchorRegistry, an immutable on-chain provenance registry. We provide gas complexity analysis demonstrating O(1) cost invariant to registry scale, and a trustless reconstruction algorithm recovering the complete registry from public event logs alone.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
