委托简单博弈中投票权的计算与贿赂
Computation and Bribery of Voting Power in Delegative Simple Games
摘要：
继Zhang和Grossi~（AAAI 2021）之后，我们更深入地研究了加权投票博弈的一个变体，其中代理人的权重由传递支持结构引起。这类简单的博弈特别适合于研究流动民主框架中代理人的相对重要性。我们首先提出了一个伪多项式时间算法来计算这类博弈的Banzhaf和Shapley-Shubik指数。然后，我们研究了一个贿赂问题，其中一个试图最大化/最小化的投票权/权重的一个给定的代理人通过改变支持结构下的预算约束。我们表明，这些问题是计算困难，并提供了几个参数化的复杂性结果。
英文摘要：
Following Zhang and Grossi~(AAAI 2021), we study in more depth a variant of weighted voting games in which agents' weights are induced by a transitive support structure. This class of simple games is notably well suited to study the relative importance of agents in the liquid democracy framework. We first propose a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to compute the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices for this class of game. Then, we study a bribery problem, in which one tries to maximize/minimize the voting power/weight of a given agent by changing the support structure under a budget constraint. We show that these problems are computationally hard and provide several parameterized complexity results.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
