掉期贿赂
Swap Bribery
摘要：
在投票理论中，贿赂是一种操纵行为，其中外部行为者（贿赂者）提出支付选民改变他们的选票，以使她喜欢的候选人当选。我们调查了一个贿赂模型，其中每一票的价格取决于选民被要求实施的改变的数量。具体来说，在我们的模型中，贿赂者可以通过支付连续候选人的交换序列来改变选民的偏好列表。每一笔交易的价格都可能不同;贿赂的价格是所有交易价格的总和。我们证明了这个模型的复杂性结果，我们称之为交换贿赂，广泛的一类选举制度，包括变种的批准和K-批准，博尔达，科普兰，和最大化。
英文摘要：
In voting theory, bribery is a form of manipulative behavior in which an external actor (the briber) offers to pay the voters to change their votes in order to get her preferred candidate elected. We investigate a model of bribery where the price of each vote depends on the amount of change that the voter is asked to implement. Specifically, in our model the briber can change a voter's preference list by paying for a sequence of swaps of consecutive candidates. Each swap may have a different price; the price of a bribery is the sum of the prices of all swaps that it involves. We prove complexity results for this model, which we call swap bribery, for a broad class of election systems, including variants of approval and k-approval, Borda, Copeland, and maximin.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
