arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1906.08308cs.GTcs.CCcs.MA
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连续选举中网上贿赂的复杂性

The Complexity of Online Bribery in Sequential Elections

Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Joerg Rothe

摘要:

以前关于贿赂复杂性的研究假设贿赂是同时发生的,而且贿赂者完全知道所有的选票。然而,在许多现实世界中,投票是按顺序进行的,贿赂者可能有一个使用它或失去它的时刻来决定是否改变给定的投票,当做出决定时,贿赂者可能不知道剩下的选民会投什么票。我们介绍了一个模型,并开始研究,贿赂在这样一个在线的,连续的设置。我们表明,即使是选举系统的赢家确定问题是多项式时间可计算的,在线,顺序设置可能会大大增加贿赂的复杂性,跳跃的问题,以完成高层次的多项式层次结构,甚至PSPACE。但我们也表明,对于一些自然的,重要的选举系统,这样一个戏剧性的复杂性增加不会发生,我们指出他们的贿赂问题的复杂性。

英文摘要:

Prior work on the complexity of bribery assumes that the bribery happens simultaneously, and that the briber has full knowledge of all votes. However, in many real-world settings votes come in sequentially, and the briber may have a use-it-or-lose-it moment to decide whether to alter a given vote, and when making that decision the briber may not know what votes remaining voters will cast. We introduce a model for, and initiate the study of, bribery in such an online, sequential setting. We show that even for election systems whose winner-determination problem is polynomial-time computable, an online, sequential setting may vastly increase the complexity of bribery, jumping the problem up to completeness for high levels of the polynomial hierarchy or even PSPACE. But we also show that for some natural, important election systems, such a dramatic complexity increase does not occur, and we pinpoint the complexity of their bribery problems.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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