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arXiv 2301.04009cs.GTcs.DS
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两阶段多数决规则的复杂性

On the Complexity of the Two-Stage Majoritarian Rule

Saarland University(萨尔兰大学)

Yongjie Yang

AI总结:

本文研究了两阶段多数决规则在议程控制、联盟操纵等八个选举控制问题上的复杂性,揭示了该规则在不同决策场景下的计算复杂性。

摘要:

在议会和立法框架中,顺序投票规则在决策塑造中发挥了关键作用。在观察到现有顺序规则未能满足几个基本公理后,Horan和Sprumont[2022]提出了一种名为两阶段多数决规则(TSMR)的顺序规则。本文通过研究议程控制、联盟操纵、可能赢家、必要赢家以及八个标准选举控制问题的复杂性来检验该规则。我们的研究为这些问题的复杂性景观提供了全面的见解。

英文摘要:

Sequential voting rules have played a crucial role in shaping decisions within parliamentary and legislative frameworks. After observing that the existing sequential rules fail several fundamental axioms, Horan and Sprumont [2022] proposed a sequential rule named two-stage majoritarian rule (TSMR). This paper examines this rule by investigating the complexity of {\sc{Agenda Control}}, {\sc{Coalition Manipulation}}, {\sc{Possible Winner}}, {\sc{Necessary Winner}}, and eight standard election control problems. Our study offers a comprehensive insight into the complexity landscape of these problems.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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