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arXiv 2602.10290cs.GTcs.CC
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初选选举中战略行为的复杂性

The Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Primary Elections

King’s College London(伦敦国王学院)

Colin Cleveland, Bart de Keijzer, Maria Polukarov

AI总结:

本文研究了初选选举中战略行为的计算复杂性,发现确定纳什均衡存在性为 Σ_2^P 完全,最佳回应计算为 NP 完全,子博弈完美均衡存在性为 PSPACE 完全。

摘要:

我们研究了初选选举中战略行为的计算复杂性。与直接投票系统不同,初选引入了一个多阶段过程,选民首先影响党内候选人的产生,然后一般选举决定最终的胜者。虽然之前的工作通过福利扭曲来评估初选,我们却考察了其博弈论属性。我们正式制定了在第一过去制下具有固定 tie-breaking 的初选模型,并分析选民的战略行为。我们证明了确定纯纳什均衡是否存在是 Σ_2^P 完全的,计算最佳回应是 NP 完全的,而在顺序初选中决定子博弈完美均衡的存在性是 PSPACE 完全的。这些结果表明,初选从根本上增加了战略推理的计算难度,使其成为计算社会选择中复杂性理论挑战的丰富来源。

英文摘要:

We study the computational complexity of strategic behaviour in primary elections. Unlike direct voting systems, primaries introduce a multi-stage process in which voters first influence intra-party nominees before a general election determines the final winner. While previous work has evaluated primaries via welfare distortion, we instead examine their game-theoretic properties. We formalise a model of primaries under first-past-the-post with fixed tie-breaking and analyse voters' strategic behaviour. We show that determining whether a pure Nash equilibrium exists is $Σ_2^{\mathbf P}$-complete, computing a best response is NP-complete, and deciding the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in sequential primaries is PSPACE-complete. These results reveal that primaries fundamentally increase the computational difficulty of strategic reasoning, situating them as a rich source of complexity-theoretic challenges within computational social choice.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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