投票方法不确定条件下的策略性投票
Strategic Voting Under Uncertainty About the Voting Method
摘要：
许多关于策略性投票的理论研究都对选民对投票情况的了解做出了强有力的假设。一个制定策略的选民通常被认为知道其他选民将如何投票，并知道投票方法的规则。越来越多的文献探讨了在不确定其他人如何投票时的战略投票。在本文中，我们研究了在投票方法存在不确定性时的策略投票。我们介绍了一组投票方法的操纵性的三个概念：肯定，安全，预期的操纵性。借助一个计算机程序，我们确定投票的情况下，不确定性的投票方法可能会减少甚至消除选民的动机，歪曲她的喜好。因此，它可能是一个选举设计者的利益，希望减少战略投票，让选民不确定几个合理的投票方法将被用来确定选举的赢家。
英文摘要：
Much of the theoretical work on strategic voting makes strong assumptions about what voters know about the voting situation. A strategizing voter is typically assumed to know how other voters will vote and to know the rules of the voting method. A growing body of literature explores strategic voting when there is uncertainty about how others will vote. In this paper, we study strategic voting when there is uncertainty about the voting method. We introduce three notions of manipulability for a set of voting methods: sure, safe, and expected manipulability. With the help of a computer program, we identify voting scenarios in which uncertainty about the voting method may reduce or even eliminate a voter's incentive to misrepresent her preferences. Thus, it may be in the interest of an election designer who wishes to reduce strategic voting to leave voters uncertain about which of several reasonable voting methods will be used to determine the winners of an election.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
