投票协议中的自然策略能力
Natural Strategic Abilities in Voting Protocols
AI总结：
本文提出一种基于用户策略行为复杂性的分级安全概念，通过电子投票场景的案例研究，建模并分析了投票者维持安全属性所需的策略复杂性、资源消耗及防御攻击的难度。
摘要：
安全性属性通常侧重于系统的技术层面。人们隐含地假设用户会以正确的方式行事，以维持手头的属性。在现实生活中，这不能被视为理所当然。特别是，难以使用且成本高昂的安全机制常常被用户忽视，并不能真正保护系统免受可能的攻击。\n在此，我们提出了一种基于用户策略行为复杂性的分级安全概念。更准确地说，我们建议安全属性 $φ$ 得以满足的程度可以根据以下两点来定义： 投票者为使 $φ$ 成立所需执行的策略的复杂性，以及 用户在此过程中必须使用的资源。获得 $φ$ 越简单、越廉价，安全程度就越高。\n我们通过一个基于电子投票场景的案例研究展示了该想法的运作方式。为此，我们对用于抗胁迫和投票者可验证选举的 \Pret 投票协议的 vVote 实现进行了建模。然后，我们确定了投票者获得收据无关性的“自然”策略，并测量了它们所需的投票者努力程度。我们还研究了胁迫者通过随机化攻击破坏选举的难度。
英文摘要：
Security properties are often focused on the technological side of the system. One implicitly assumes that the users will behave in the right way to preserve the property at hand. In real life, this cannot be taken for granted. In particular, security mechanisms that are difficult and costly to use are often ignored by the users, and do not really defend the system against possible attacks. Here, we propose a graded notion of security based on the complexity of the user's strategic behavior. More precisely, we suggest that the level to which a security property $φ$ is satisfied can be defined in terms of (a) the complexity of the strategy that the voter needs to execute to make $φ$ true, and (b) the resources that the user must employ on the way. The simpler and cheaper to obtain $φ$, the higher the degree of security. We demonstrate how the idea works in a case study based on an electronic voting scenario. To this end, we model the vVote implementation of the \Pret voting protocol for coercion-resistant and voter-verifiable elections. Then, we identify "natural" strategies for the voter to obtain receipt-freeness, and measure the voter's effort that they require. We also look at how hard it is for the coercer to compromise the election through a randomization attack.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
