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arXiv cs/0205073cs.GTcs.CCcs.MA
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投票诱导:复杂性和策略验证

Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm

摘要:

偏好诱导是人工智能的核心问题,在单智能体环境中受到了极大的关注。它也是多智能体系统中的一个关键问题,但迄今为止在这里很少受到关注。在这种情况下,代理可能有不同的偏好,通常必须使用投票进行汇总。这就引出了一个有趣的问题,因为应该从一个智能体那里得到什么样的信息(如果有的话)取决于其他智能体迄今为止透露的关于他们偏好的信息。在本文中,我们研究有效的启发,和它的障碍,最常见的投票协议。事实证明,在单一可转移投票协议中,即使知道何时终止诱导也是数学NP完全的,而这对于正在研究的所有其他协议都很容易。即使对于这些协议,确定如何有效地引出也是NP完全的,即使完全怀疑代理人将如何投票。例外是Plurality协议,其中这种有效的启发很容易。我们还表明,诱导选民的战略操纵引入了额外的机会。我们展示了如何削减空间的启发式计划,使没有这样的额外的战略问题出现。

英文摘要:

Preference elicitation is a central problem in AI, and has received significant attention in single-agent settings. It is also a key problem in multiagent systems, but has received little attention here so far. In this setting, the agents may have different preferences that often must be aggregated using voting. This leads to interesting issues because what, if any, information should be elicited from an agent depends on what other agents have revealed about their preferences so far. In this paper we study effective elicitation, and its impediments, for the most common voting protocols. It turns out that in the Single Transferable Vote protocol, even knowing when to terminate elicitation is mathcal NP-complete, while this is easy for all the other protocols under study. Even for these protocols, determining how to elicit effectively is NP-complete, even with perfect suspicions about how the agents will vote. The exception is the Plurality protocol where such effective elicitation is easy. We also show that elicitation introduces additional opportunities for strategic manipulation by the voters. We demonstrate how to curtail the space of elicitation schemes so that no such additional strategic issues arise.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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