议会投票程序：议程控制、操纵与不确定性
Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty
摘要：
我们研究两个流行的议会投票程序：修正程序和连续程序的计算问题。虽然发现成功的操纵或议程控制是易于处理的两个程序，我们的现实世界的实验结果表明，大多数选举不能被少数选民操纵和议程控制通常是不可能的。如果选民的偏好是不完整的，那么找出哪些替代品可能会赢得这两个过程是NP困难的。虽然决定一个替代方案是否必然获胜对于修正程序来说是困难的，但对于连续的一个替代方案来说是多项式时间可解的。
英文摘要：
We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our real-world experimental results indicate that most elections cannot be manipulated by a few voters and agenda control is typically impossible. If the voter preferences are incomplete, then finding which alternatives can possibly win is NP-hard for both procedures. Whilst deciding if an alternative necessarily wins is coNP-hard for the amendment procedure, it is polynomial-time solvable for the successive one.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
