关于控制修正案程序与连续程序胜者的参数化复杂性
On the Parameterized Complexity of Controlling Amendment and Successive Winners
AI总结：
本文研究修正案程序与连续程序中通过增删选民或候选人进行建设性/破坏性控制的参数化复杂性，并推广修正案程序，给出多参数下的完整复杂性图景。
摘要：
连续程序和修正案程序已被广泛应用于议会和立法决策，并在文献中从多个角度得到广泛研究。然而，迄今为止，从计算复杂性理论的视角对其进行的考察，尚不如对许多其他流行投票程序那样深入。据我们所知，在当前工作之前，仅有一篇论文探讨了这两种程序下若干策略投票问题的复杂性。为了更好地理解这两种程序在多大程度上能够抵御策略行为，我们研究了在两种程序下，通过增加/删除选民或候选人来实施建设性/破坏性控制的参数化复杂性。为增强结果的普适性，我们还考察了修正案程序的一种更一般化形式。我们的探索给出了这些问题在众多参数下的完整（参数化）复杂性图景。
英文摘要：
The successive and the amendment procedures have been widely employed in parliamentary and legislative decision making and have undergone extensive study in the literature from various perspectives. However, investigating them through the lens of computational complexity theory has not been as thoroughly conducted as for many other prevalent voting procedures heretofore. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one paper which explores the complexity of several strategic voting problems under these two procedures, prior to our current work. To provide a better understanding of to what extent the two procedures resist strategic behavior, we study the parameterized complexity of constructive/destructive control by adding/deleting voters/candidates for both procedures. To enhance the generalizability of our results, we also examine a more generalized form of the amendment procedure. Our exploration yields a comprehensive (parameterized) complexity landscape of these problems with respect to numerous parameters.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
