代表不真诚：战略上稳健的比例代表
Representing the Insincere: Strategically Robust Proportional Representation
摘要：
比例代表制（PR）是世界上许多民主国家的基本原则，它们采用基于PR的投票规则来选举代表。然而，这些投票规则的规范性属性往往只在真诚投票的背景下被理解。在本文中，我们认为公关存在的战略选民。我们构造了一个投票规则，使得对于每个偏好配置文件，存在至少一个代价高昂的投票均衡，满足PR关于选民的私人和未透露的偏好-这样的投票规则被认为是战略上强大的。相比之下，一个常用的投票规则是不具有战略鲁棒性。此外，我们证明了一个限制“如何在战略上强大的”PR为基础的投票规则可以，我们表明，没有PR为基础的投票规则，确保每个均衡满足PR。总的来说，我们的研究结果突出了实现PR的可能性和限制在战略选民的存在和机制，如选举前的民意调查，协调选民的行为对均衡，满足PR的积极作用。
英文摘要：
Proportional representation (PR) is a fundamental principle of many democracies world-wide which employ PR-based voting rules to elect their representatives. The normative properties of these voting rules however, are often only understood in the context of sincere voting. In this paper we consider PR in the presence of strategic voters. We construct a voting rule such that for every preference profile there exists at least one costly voting equilibrium satisfying PR with respect to voters' private and unrevealed preferences - such a voting rule is said to be strategically robust. In contrast, a commonly applied voting rule is shown not be strategically robust. Furthermore, we prove a limit on `how strategically robust' a PR-based voting rule can be; we show that there is no PR-based voting rule which ensures that every equilibrium satisfies PR. Collectively, our results highlight the possibility and limit of achieving PR in the presence of strategic voters and a positive role for mechanisms, such as pre-election polls, which coordinate voter behaviour towards equilibria which satisfy PR.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
