发表机构
Cardano Foundation（卡达诺基金会）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文研究PoS治理中委托代表人的奖励设计，提出条件性奖励规则使真诚投票在对称正努力水平下严格最优，并可能提升努力与决策准确性，但存在不真诚均衡。
AI 中文摘要
我们研究了针对委托代表人的奖励设计问题，这些代表人获取昂贵的信息并就二元治理提案进行投票。努力程度既改善了私人信息，也增加了委托投票权重。我们证明，在非中性先验下，没有任何支付规则能使真诚投票在每一个正努力水平下严格最优，而固定预算在大型对称委员会中限制了准确性。然后，我们将比例分享与一种条件性规则进行比较，该规则仅奖励足够大的获胜联盟中的成员。与仅通过无差异支持真诚投票的比例分享不同，条件性规则使真诚投票在对称正努力水平下严格最优。它支持与比例分享相同努力水平的真诚均衡，并且在适当的奖励-成本条件下，支持严格更高的努力水平和决策准确性。然而，不真诚的均衡可能同时存在。
英文摘要
We study reward design for delegated representatives who acquire costly information and vote on a binary governance proposal. Effort improves both private information and delegated voting weight. We show that no payment rule can make sincere voting strictly optimal at every positive effort profile under a non-neutral prior, while fixed budgets limit accuracy in large symmetric committees. We then compare proportional sharing with a conditional rule that rewards only members of a sufficiently large winning coalition. Unlike proportional sharing, which supports sincere voting only through indifference, the conditional rule makes sincere voting strictly optimal at symmetric positive effort profiles. It supports sincere equilibria with the same effort as proportional sharing and, under suitable reward-cost conditions, with strictly higher effort and decision accuracy. Insincere equilibria may nevertheless coexist.
