基于非确定性比例共识的有效民主决策
Efficient democratic decisions via nondeterministic proportional consensus
摘要：
是否有这样的投票方法：（一）即使选民采取战略性行动，也能使每个人，包括少数群体，平等地分享有效权力;（二）促进共识，而不是两极分化和不平等;（三）不赞成维持现状或过于依赖机会？我们的答案是肯定的，通过描述两个不确定的投票方法，一个基于自动讨价还价的彩票，其他有条件的承诺，以批准妥协的选择。我们的理论分析和基于代理的模拟实验表明，与这些，多数不能一贯压制少数与确定性的方法，现状的支持者不能阻止决策，在基于共识的方法，由此产生的总福利是可比的现有方法，平均随机性低于其他非确定性的方法。
英文摘要：
Are there voting methods which (i) give everyone, including minorities, an equal share of effective power even if voters act strategically, (ii) promote consensus rather than polarization and inequality, and (iii) do not favour the status quo or rely too much on chance? We show the answer is yes by describing two nondeterministic voting methods, one based on automatic bargaining over lotteries, the other on conditional commitments to approve compromise options. Our theoretical analysis and agent-based simulation experiments suggest that with these, majorities cannot consistently suppress minorities as with deterministic methods, proponents of the status quo cannot block decisions as in consensus-based approaches, the resulting aggregate welfare is comparable to existing methods, and average randomness is lower than for other nondeterministic methods.
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